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Abstract  
We examine the effects of learning by migrating on the productivity of migrants who 
move to a “megalopolis” from rural areas using the Thailand Labor Force Survey. 
The main contribution is to the development a simple framework to test for 
self-selection on migration decisions and learning by migrating into the urban labor 
market, focusing on experimental evidence in the observational data. The role of the 
urban labor market is examined. In conclusion, we find significant evidence for 
sorting: the self-selection effects test (1) is positive among new entrants from rural 
areas to the urban labor market; and (2) is negative among new exits that move to 
rural areas from the urban labor market. Further, estimated effects of learning by 
migrating into a “megalopolis” have a less significant impact. These results suggest 
the existence of a natural selection (i.e. survival of the fittest) mechanism in the 
urban labor market in a developing economy. 
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the e®ects of learning by migrating on the productivity of migrants
who move to a \megalopolis" from rural areas using the Thailand Labor Force Survey Data, 1994 to 1996.
The main contributions of this paper are: (1) providing a simple empirical framework to identify between
self-selection e®ects in migration decisions and learning by migrating e®ects; (2) discussing the role of the
urban labor market (i.e. natural selection or location of human capital accumulation). This study is one
contribution to understanding the unobserved characteristics of migrants in a concentrated area. Policy
makers, economists, and researchers of other ¯elds such as sociology and anthropology are also interested
in sorting through urban immigration and unobserved heterogeneity of urban workers. In particular, policy
makers, macroeconomists, and labor economists are interested in the role of such a concentrated area to
provide job matching and their aggregate properties. Due to the causal e®ects of migration decisions and
individual characteristics, it has been di±cult to identify the true impact of concentrated areas on migrant's
wages and job matching. Thanks to exogenous sources of variation (or natural experiments) in the available
empirical data, the impact of migration on wages is consistently estimated. Based on these estimates, we
can begin to discuss the role of the urban labor market, active labor market policies in urban areas, and
their aggregate implications.
Trying to identify self-selection e®ects and learning e®ects among migrants is a growing ¯eld. Using
observational data, whether we use repeated cross-section or panel data become a serious concern. Using
cross-section data, Borjas, Bronars and Trejo (1992) ¯nd positive self-selection among inter-state migrants
in the United States. Tunali (2000) ¯nds evidence of a lottery in the outcomes from migration decisions
in Turkey. His result suggests that a substantial portion of migrants realize negative gains and a minority
realize very high gains from migration. Using panel-data, Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) study a similar
question on the export market using panel-data. No empirical evidence of learning e®ects (i.e. improving
productivity) by exporting are observed from their analysis. Self-selection in the domestic market is the
main explanation for becoming exporters. Glaeser and Mar¶e (2001) ¯nds learning by migrating e®ects in
cities after movements from small cities to large cities. On the other hand, studying internal learning by mi-
grating e®ects is also a growing ¯eld: Yamauchi (2003) ¯nds that complementarities between schooling and
experience are reinforced as a migrant's experience increases in the destination market (Bangkok Metropoli-
tan Area) using Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994 to 1996. Using the same data as Yamauchi (2003),
Yamauchi and Tanabe (2006) conclude that the employment probability of recent migrants is negatively
a®ected by a large population size of previous migrants originating from the same region and positively af-
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fected by success of the previous migrants in getting work. Kimura (2004) examines the main explanations
for the urban wage premium: learning skills and learning job opportunities in the urban labor market using
household-block-level data in the Thailand Labor Force Survey. Like previous studies on the aggregate labor
market and urban immigration, this study uses pooled cross-sections. Munshi (2003) focuses on employ-
ment at the destination among Mexican migrants in the U.S. labor market. He uses rainfall in the origin
(Mexico) as an instrumental variable to identify origin-communities network e®ects on employment oppor-
tunities at the destination. Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2003) estimate a model wage determination
across the French local labor market using a large panel of workers. They control for worker characteristics,
worker-¯xed e®ects, industry-¯xed e®ects, and the conditions of the local labor market using a competitive
equilibrium model. They ¯nd that ability sorting is the main explanation for spatial wage disparities.
Two unique characteristics in the available data are useful for our analysis: the \reason for migration"
and \duration of stay" of migrants. A controlled experiment is constructed with these variables in the
Thailand Labor Force Survey. This experiment enables us to identify self-selection e®ects and learning
e®ects and to estimate the e®ects of concentrated area using observational data. The variable the \reason
for migration" includes two types of migrants; job-seekers and migrants who move along with the household
head. The location choice for job-seekers is self-selective based on their observed and unobserved charac-
teristics. On the other hand, the location choice for migrants who move with the household head seems to
be independent of their characteristics. Location choice is exogenous for these household migrants. We can
observe true location speci¯c returns for migrants who move with the household head. To see the degree of
self-selection bias for job-seekers, this paper compares the returns to location between job-seekers and house-
hold relations migrants. Clear results are drawn from our identi¯cation strategy. This is very similar to the
study estimating the heterogeneity of reason of displacement (plant-closing versus lay-o®) on re-employment
outcomes by Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Gibbons and Katz (1992). Our paper is the ¯rst attempt to
identify self-selection and learning e®ects related to migration using exogenous sources of variation in mi-
gration decisions. The variable \duration of stay" for migrants suggests the possibility to examine learning
e®ects of migration. There is a large wage di®erence between short-staying and long-staying migrants in
each location. This pattern is quite di®erent for migration streams; rural-rural, urban-rural, rural-urban,
and urban-urban. The di®erence between cohorts provides evidence of improving average productivity. The
cohort di®erence between the reasons for migration (i.e. di®erence in di®erences) also provides the solution
to the di®erence of learning by migrating e®ects between two types of migrants.
The innovative feature of this work is that we utilize experimental evidence from observational data to
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identify the self-selection of unobserved characteristics and examine the e®ects of learning by migrating in
urban and rural areas, respectively. The main results are: ¯rst, positive self-selection among new migrants
to urban from rural areas (i.e. new entrants into the urban labor market); secondly, negative self-selection
among new migrants in rural areas (i.e. \new exits" from the urban labor market). These results suggest the
existence of a natural selection (survival of the ¯ttest) mechanism in the urban labor market. \New exits"
from the urban area seem to have the potential to take their acquired skill. These results show learning by
migrating e®ects in urban area over time. This e®ect is larger in urban than rural areas.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a simple model for understanding some empirical
hypotheses. Section 3 shows the structure of the dataset of the Thailand Labor Force Survey. Section
4 contains a simple identi¯cation framework for studying self-selection e®ects on unobserved abilities and
learning by migrating e®ects. While Section 5 deals with the estimation of self-selection bias on individual
characteristics, section 6 focuses on learning by migrating e®ects. In the ¯nal section, we conclude the paper
and discuss the remaining issues.
2 The Attraction of Cities: The Bangkok Megalopolis
Let us start by focusing on the geography of Thailand. Table 1 shows the patterns of urbanization of
Thailand. We observe a unique position for Thailand in the world from three indices of urbanization
patterns. An urban area is de¯ned as place with over one hundred thousand inhabitants. This criteria is
the lower bound of the de¯nition of urban area.1 Primacy means the level of urban primacy and in the
case of Thailanld is the ratio of urban population residing in Bangkok compared to the second largest city.
The usrban primacy of Thailand (about 25) is the highest in the world. Megalopolitan is the people living
in Bangkok to the total urban population in Thailand. Almost 77% of urban residents are concentrated in
Bangkok. These two indices show an agglomeration of economic activity in Bangkok and also demonstrate
that there is only one megalopolis in Thailand. Finally, Urbanization means the ratio of the number of
urban residents to the whole domestic population. Only 15% of the whole population is located in urban
areas (i.e. almost 85% of the population is located in rural areas.). These indices show a clear contrast
between urban and rural areas in Thailand.
These indices of economic geography in Thailand can simplify our empirical analysis. The same is not
1We should notice that this criteria is correlated with domestic population. For example, the USA seems to easily satisfy
this criteria because it has a population of about two hundred million. On the other hand, Thailand (60 million population
¼ 3=10 of the USA) does not satisfy this.
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true, however, of the USA data. Large cities seem to be distributed discretely in the USA. If we see the
USA data, we have to set up multiple discrete choice models. We refer to the Greater Bangkok Area as the
urban area. We assume that workers can commute to the center of Bangkok as long as they locate in GBA.
GBA seems to be a kind of basin of attraction. We also de¯ne all rural areas as non-GBA.
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3 A Model of Migrating and Learning in Megalopolis
This section presents a simple model of decisions to migrate to the Bangkok labor market among workers in
rural areas. The model is constructed by three stages: migration, production, and reshu²ing (exits). Stage
1 is the migration decision stage. Production and reshu²ing are stage 2 and 3, respectively. The model is
based on the study of migration decisions to the U.S. labor market among Mexican migrants by Munshi
(2003) and the schooling (English or local language) choice in the Bombay labor market among castes by
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) (stage 1). The searching and production in the Bangkok labor market after
migration is based on the model of imperfect information, learning, and worker mobility by Gibbons and
Katz (1992) (stage 2 and 3).
3.1 Setup
The model provides an explanation and overview of the causal relationship between abilities, decisions to
migrate to Bangkok, and natural selection through exits from Bangkok labor market. The geography is
simply divided into rural areas and the Bangkok labor market. We assume that the Bangkok labor market
is ruled by the geographic boundaries of the Greater Bangkok Area (hereafter GBA). The timing is divided
into three periods. In the ¯rst stage, potential migrants (in rural areas) decide whether they will move to
GBA or stay in the rural area. The migration decision is based on the wage that the potential migrants
will receive in an urban job and rural job. Wages in the urban job (°j!i) are assumed to be based on the
migrants' ability or productivity. The returns to ability in the Bangkok labor market is described by °j .
Wages in rural jobs such as pro¯ts from an agricultural area R are not contingent on the worker's ability
or productivity. This assumption can be relaxed in the empirical speci¯cation using an industry speci¯c
shock (¾) in the rural area. This shock is considered to involve the agricultural sector or export-oriented
industries in the rural area. The returns to working in the rural area can be summarized as R(¾).2 On
the other hand, individual's abilities !i are distributed uniformly. The ability distribution of premigration
(born) level of ability does not between rural and GBA.
The second stage starts from the beginning of work in the urban job. Each ¯rm (or sector) j is endowed
with a type of technology °j . This is also returns to ability in the Bangkok labor market. Each migrant
produces a commodity and receives wages Wij = °j!i under his/her own abilities and ¯rm technologies.
Following the setting of Gibbons and Katz (1992), technology is restrict to two types; ability-sensitive
2In July 1997, the returns to agricultural sector and export-oriented industries rose due to the baht devaluation. These
sectors were booming because of exogenous currency advantages. The causal e®ects of the ¯nancial shock in 1997 on rural and
urban labor market is task for the future.
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technology (°A) and ability-insensitive technology (°B). We assume that the information on worker's abilities
is imperfect at this stage but improves over time as long as migrants stay in the urban labor market. Job
matching with urban jobs is random at the second stage. We also apply the story of Gibbons and Katz
(1992) to our framework. Endogenous mobility improves the job matching between workers and industries.
Highly able workers employed in ¯rm B can switch to ¯rm A while workers with low ability employed in ¯rm
A can switch to ¯rm B at stage 3. This process can be explained by the learning e®ects in the urban area.
The ¯nal stage starts from the time when there is perfect observation of worker's ability. The matching
process is not random in the stage 3. The search markets are segmented, and positively associated with the
worker's abilities and the ¯rm's technologies at this stage. There is endogenous mobility of workers among
two types of ¯rms in the ¯nal stage.3
3.2 Abilities and the Migration Equilibrium
Migration decisions are based on the returns to urban job. The returns to ¯rm (or sector) in urban area is
determined by a lottery. Each worker knows the level of his/her own abilities. Potential migrants observe
the expected value of returns to abilities in urban area E(°) in the second and third stage for individual i.
For simplicity, we assume that E(°) summarizes the returns to ability at both the second and third stage.
The expected returns to the urban job for individual i with ability !i in the rural area is E(Wi) = E(°)¤!i.
Following Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), ability is assumed to have a level of !i 2 f0; 12 ; 1g. The expected
returns to the urban job is zero, E(°)/2, and E(°) respectively. Three types of migration equilibria arise: (1)
only low type workers remain in rural areas, (2) low and medium types remain in rural areas, (3) everyone
remains in rural areas. Each condition can be sustained within each rural area.
Condition 1 R < E(°)=2
Condition 2 E(°)=2 < R < E(°)
Condition 3 E(°) < R
The statistical inference of the conditions is our target. We are able to test for self-selection on the migration
decision using the observational data including characteristics of migrants and employment outcome at the
destination.
3Before turning to observe the migration decision, we add some mention of learning in the urban labor market. Instead of
deriving the learning process (job shopping/sectoral mobility/and beween-job mobility) following Jovanovic (1979), Gibbons
and Katz (1992), Topel and Ward (1993), Farber and Gibbons (1996), Neal (1999), and providing direct evidence from NLSY by
Yankow (2003), this paper assumes that the e®ects of learning by migrating on wages appears in sectoral movers and between-job
movers in urban area.
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Our theoretical framework predicts that (1) the probability of staying in a rural area is negatively related
to the individual's abilities and (2) the returns to the urban job E(Wi) are positively related to the abilities
!i and assignment to the urban migrants sample D.
Pr(Di = 1) = 1¡ !i (1)
logWij = ®+ ¯D(!i) + !i + °j (2)
These speci¯cation need to be veri¯ed empirically to get a consistent estimate of the e®ects of urban migrants
on the returns to the urban job. We can estimate the returns to the urban job using observational data.
The main point of this expression is the causal e®ects of abilities !i on the incidence of urban migrants
D(!i). The empirical methodology for estimating the returns to the urban job is shown in section 5.
3.3 Testable Hypotheses
We summarize our simple model for describing some testable hypotheses here. The model has the following
theoretical implications: (1) the probability of staying in rural area is negatively related to the individual's
abilities and (2) the returns to the urban job are positively correlated to the abilities and incidence of the
urban migrants. It is time now to formulate some empirical questions or some testable hypotheses regarding
the rural and urban labor markets: do individuals become more productive after moving to the megalopolis?
Three testable hypotheses are described simply here. The ¯rst hypothesis supports self-selection in the
migration decision: relatively e±cient individuals become migrants and these individuals also have a good
job-match in the new location. We test it for each migration streams. The second hypothesis support the
improvement of average productivity over time: the average performance of migrants with long experience
is better than those with short experience due to sorting or learning by migrating.
Hypothesis 1 There is a positive self-selection on individual abilities for \new entrants" into the urban
labor market. There is a negative self-selection on individual abilities for \new exits" from the urban labor
market.
This hypothesis suggests that (1) a young worker with high abilities moves from the rural to the urban labor
market and (2) a young worker with low abilities moves from the urban to the rural labor market. This
implies the existence of natural selection mechanism exists in the urban labor market.
Hypothesis 2 Average productivity for a long stayer is higher than that of a short stayer in the rural and
urban labor market through the two-sided learning process between ¯rm and worker (i.e. selection mechanism
over time) or learning by migrating.
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This hypothesis proposes that (1) sorting matters among the local labor market and (2) learning by migrating
exist in the local labor market.
4 Data
In this section, we examine the \reason for migration" and \duration of migration" provide statistical
evidence based on the wages of migrants, using data from the Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994 to 1996.
The data set presents three issues related to (1) geography; (2) the reason for migration and duration
of migration; (3) evidence on wages. In fact, the proper treatment of these issues provides the key to
understanding the self-selection mechanism and learning by migrating e®ects for migrants.
4.1 The Thailand Labor Force Survey
The data source used in this paper is The Thailand Labor Force Survey (hereafter LFS), 1994-1996 by
the The National Statistical O±ce (NSO) of Thailand. This individual-level data provides the information
on many individual characteristics: gender, structure of family, years of schooling, years of labor market
experience, wages (or pro¯t for self-employed household and pro¯t for agricultural household), labor force
status, migration status, hours and days of weekly work, occupation, industry, region, marital status; and
employer characteristics: ¯rm size, industry, and fringe bene¯ts.
LFS is implemented four times per year. The ¯rst round of the survey is done in February, the dry season
in Thailand. The third round is done in August, during the monsoon (agricultural) season. We use only
the third round survey because we can neglect seasonal labor migration at the dry season. The second and
third rounds are carried out in May and November, respectively. Because LFS does not follow individuals
from year to year, this study cannot provide the information on labor mobility from the pre-crisis period to
post crisis period.
The sample used in this paper comes from not only the \Greater Bangkok Area" and rural areas: we
use the whole sample of the Kingdom of Thailand, year 1994 to year 1996. We would like to mention some
of the geographic characteristics. This paper constructs a GBA (Greater Bangkok Area) dummy variable
equals to 1 if the province is included in the Bangkok metropolitan area. Almost all industry and occupation
tend to agglomerate in GBA.
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4.2 Data on Migrants
Here, we shall examine our pooled sample of the Thailand Labor Force Survey (hereafter LFS). LFS is
a random sampling of all households in Thailand taken during two survey rounds (February and August)
every year. This paper pools the annual sample of LFS in 1994 to 1996. We do not add our sample to the
LFS from 1997 to present. But the impacts were uneven for each occupation and industry. The number
of pooled observations adds up to approximately one million. This paper leaves out agricultural and self-
employed workers, housewives, and students. The result is a sample of 250,000 wage workers in which
53,529 are migrants. We concentrate on this sample in this paper to do a statistical inference with aggregate
patterns of migration and its microeconomic consequences. We do not examine the 200,000 residents (i.e.
non-migrants) among the sample of wage workers. The main contents of LFS are the following: gender,
age, years of education, weekly wage, bonus, occupation, industry, ¯rm size, unemployment spells, reason
for migration, and length of stay when the survey was taken.
For the moment, let us look closely at our key variables for empirical analysis. Variables such as
the \reason for migration" and \length of stay when the survey was taken" (or duration and exposure
to destination) have unique characteristics. The variable the \reason for migration" can be grouped into
seven categories: (1) Job search; (2) Job transfer; (3) Education/Training; (4) Medical treatment; (5) Back
to former place of residence; (6) Move with household head; and (7) Other reasons. These reasons are
automatically recorded for migrants who have 0 to 4 years of experience in each destination. Next, duration
or exposure to each destination is recorded for migrants who also have 0 to 4 years of experience in each
destination.4 Based on the length of stay in migrant primacy destination, we shall classify migrants into
two main groups: (A) Job search, job transfer, and back to former place of residence; (B) Move with the
household head. We call the former group \Job-seeking" or \Job related". This distinct classi¯cation is
useful for our identi¯cation and estimation in the next section. We exclude the following three categories:
(3) Education/Training; (4) Medical treatment; and (7) Other reasons. This paper focuses on the following
categories: (1) Job search; (2) Job transfer; (5) Back to former place of residence; (6) Move with household
head. Secondly, migration streams are also divided into four types: (1 ) from rural to rural areas; (2 ) from
urban to rural areas; (3 ) from rural to urban areas; and (4 ) from urban to urban areas. Thirdly, the
duration of migrant status is divided into ¯ve categories: less than 1 year; 1 year; 2 years; 3 years; and 4
years of duration. All migrants are classi¯ed by reason of migration, migration stream, and length of stay.
4Migrants who have 5 to 9 years of experience are also recorded. However, there is no record of the original area, making
it impossible for us to specify their migration streams from original area to destination area. Thus, we do not include these
migrants who have 5 to 9 years of experience in our empirical analysis.
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We tabulate the relationship between the reason for migration and duration of destination in Table 2.
The main group is rural to rural movers who accounts for almost 40,000 migrants among the total sample of
53,000 Thai migrants. Our focus is on migrants who have experience in the Greater Bangkok Area: urban
to rural movers and rural to urban movers. Migration attributed for the purpose of study also constitutes
about 20% of all migrants. First, the tendency of exit rises to a peak within the ¯rst year of the move and
after 3 years for migrants due to looking job searches. On the other hand, the tendency of exit also rises to
a peak after 3 years for migrants due for migrants who move with the household head.
4.3 Evidence on Wages by Migration Status
We are now ready to look at the evidence of wages on migration status. We already assumed two labor
markets: rural and urban. First, we look at the sample of new entrants into the rural labor market from
rural areas. Secondly, we also look at the sample of new entrants into the rural labor market from urban
areas. The mean, standard deviations, and number of observations are shown in each cell by migration
status. The descriptive statistics for new entrants into the rural labor market is shown in Table 3, using
the whole sample. Comparing the wage di®erentials between less than 1 year and 4 years of duration in the
sample of rural-rural migrants, we ¯nd a gradual growth (from 6.656 to 6.959) in the long-staying migrants.
Comparing the wage di®erentials between less than 1 year and 4 years of duration in the sample of urban-
rural migrants, there is a sharp growth (from 6.705 to 7.114) among the long staying migrants. This sample
experienced steeper wage di®erentials than rural-rural migrants. Next, we discuss the di®erence between
origin of migration. The level of wages in rural areas is higher for migrants with some experience of urban
area than migrants moving from rural areas. This di®erence seems to represent age. Urban to rural migrants
are concentrated in their late 20s or 30s. They are usually older than rural to rural migrants or rural to
urban migrants.
The descriptive statistics for new entrants into the urban labor market are shown in Table 4. Comparing
the wage di®erentials between less than 1 year and 4 years of duration in the sample of rural-urban migrants,
we also ¯nd a gradual growth (from 6.705 to 7.114) among the long staying migrants. We also see a slow
growth (from 6.652 to 6.909) in the long staying migrants from rural areas. The level of urban wages is
also lower than for rural to rural migrants or urban to rural migrants. This is because of a di®erential of
age and labor market experience among migrants. Looking at the urban-urban category, we compare the
wage di®erentials between less than 1 year and 4 years of duration in the sample of urban-urban migrants.
There is also a gradual growth (from 6.963 to 7.266) in the long staying migrants. Next, we compare the
di®erence between origin of migration. The level of wages in urban area is higher for migrants who have
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more experience in urban areas than new migrants from rural areas. This di®erence seems to be represented
by age and urban experience. Finally, we look at the wage di®erentials between migration streams: from
rural to urban and from urban to urban. As expected, the level of wages is considerably higher for new
entrants from urban areas than new entrants from rural areas. This is most likely due to di®erentials with
respect to age, urban experience (i.e. bene¯ts from searches within urban areas or improving productivity),
and sectors (i.e. formal and informal) between the migration streams.
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5 Identi¯cation Strategy
This section provides a simple framework for empirically testing our hypotheses. We assume that a young
worker has all the information to evaluate his or her own ability as well as the returns to this ability. It
is easy for us to imagine a correlation among own ability, migration decision, destination, and returns to
ability. If there is a self-selection bias in the migration decision and destination, it is not easy to evaluate
the true learning e®ects in urban areas. This paper proposes a novel method for evaluating self-selection
and learning by migrating e®ects using the unique characteristics of the Thailand Labor Force Survey: the
\reason for migration" and \length of stay" for migrants. Our identi¯cation approach is quite di®erent from
that of Clerides et al. (1998) who study learning by exporting e®ects among Columbian, Moroccan, and
Chilean exporters using establishment level panel-data. Our identi¯cation strategy is also quite di®erent
from Glaeser and Mar¶e (2001), who examine learning e®ects in cities using US panel-data; PSID and NLSY.
First, every worker has to make a migration decision in every period: stay in the current labor market
or move to another area. We call this decision variable M 2 f0; 1g. Staying is captured by M = 0 and
moving is captured by M = 1. In this paper we restrict our analysis to movers (i.e. M = 1). Secondly,
every worker chooses his/her labor market every period: rural or urban labor market. We call this location
choice variable K 2 fR;Ug. A rural worker is captured by K = R and urban worker by K = U . Thirdly,
we de¯ne the variable Z 2 f0; 1g which is the \reason for migration" for movers. We have already classi¯ed
migrants into two main groups: Group (A) Job-Seeking (which includes job search, job transfer, and back to
former place of residence) and Group (B) Move with the household head. With respect to household-related
reasons of migration, we assume that the member moving with the household head is captured by Z = 1
and the member actively seeking employment or another reason is captured by Z = 0. These bring us to
the second point: the description of decision and state space for each individual.
These assumptions on migration decision and migration streams lead us further into an empirical investi-
gation. We assume that the household head decides whether his family will migrate or not. Therefore we use
heterogeneity in the reason for migration as an exogenous source of variation in endogenous variables. This
paper constructs a household related dummy variable D1H . If a young worker follows the household head
in moving, then the econometrician will treat the member as D1H = 1. If the job-seekers move, D1H = 0.
The indicator variable DKH is generated as follows:
DKH =
8><>: 1 if Z = 1, K for M = 10 if Z = 0, K for M = 1
The outcome variable for individual worker i in location K and at survey week s is de¯ned as Y Kis . The
13
cross-section outcome function is formalized as an additive separable form.
Y Kis = f(Xis) + ¡ ¢DKH + g (!is; »is)
where f(X) is a function of a vector of observed individual characteristics, DKH is a dummy variable equal
to one if individual i follows the household head to move to location K, and g (!is; »is) is a function of
unobserved characteristics for an individual worker and ¯rm: !is is an error term for unobserved abilities
for individual i at survey week s, and unobserved ¯rm speci¯c characteristics »is.
The choice of location K correlates to pecuniary returns to individual characteristics: an observed
component Xi and component of unobserved ability Ái. The high frequency of movement to urban area for
young and more educated workers is a known and observed fact. Young and highly educated workers know
the urban area to be a thick labor market (with varieties in occupation, industry, and technology). The
return to schooling is also higher in urban areas. Recent literature Borjas et al. (1992), Wheeler (2001),
Dahl (2002), Moretti (2004a), and Moretti (2004b) also show this using USA data. This is the logic of
self-selection. The location choice K of the migrant in the household related subgroup (Z = 1) is assumed
to be orthogonal to his/her ability !, and the location choice K of the migrant job-related subgroup (Z = 0)
is assumed to be non-orthogonal to ability ! by de¯nition.
!i / DR1H = 0; DU1H = 0
!i ? DR1H = 1; DU1H = 1
Undoubtedly, a worker in the local labor market K has a location speci¯c premium; however, the
econometrician cannot distinguish between the true premiums in location and the self-selection bias in the
migration decision. Our identi¯cation method suggests that movement with the household head is exogenous
on migration decision. We call the member of D1H = 1 the treatment group. We can examine the true e®ects
of moving to local labor market K on individual outcome by looking at the coe±cient ¡. This coe±cient
¡ signi¯es the premium di®erentials between the household related (D1H = 1) and job related (D1H = 0)
subgroup in location K. This paper develops a new and a simple identi¯cation method for distinguishing
between the true premium in K and the impact of the self-selection bias on the migration decision to K.
Next, we try to identify learning by migrating e®ects (i.e. productivity increasing based on migration) in
location K. For example, learning by migrating e®ects in urban areas include formal training, learning by
doing, knowledge spillovers by communication, reduction in mismatches by turnover, and R&D investments
by ¯rms. We assume that ¯rms can o®er a wage after removing the returns to investment in technology.
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If this assumption is valid, then we can exclude the latest possibility of learning by migrating e®ects:
investment in technology by ¯rms. Now we may restrict our discussion to learning e®ects due to individual
e®orts (i.e. learning and job turnover) and spillovers.
To study learning e®ects, we use the variable ¿ for duration of stay after migration and relate this to
experience in K. The data \length of migrant stay" ¿ 2 f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g years is useful for the identi¯cation
of learning by migrating e®ects. This paper divides years T 2 fS;Lg according to the duration of stay ¿ .
The short-staying migrant worker is captured by T = S. The longer-staying migrant worker is captured by
T = L. We de¯ne (1) a short experience as S 2 f0; 1; 2g years and (2) a long experience as L 2 f3; 4g years
of moving to current location K based on the survey week. We are also now able to expand the individual
decision space from D to DT with duration of stay.
6 Testing for Self-selection on Migration
6.1 Speci¯cation and Estimation
First, we test whether there is a self-selection bias on ability when a young worker moves to location
K. The outcome variable is the wage level. The wage represents self-selection about employment and
productivity. To test for self-selection in observed characteristics and unobserved abilities, we estimate the
reason di®erentials from the cross-section wage function following Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Gibbons
and Katz (1992) who studied the impacts of reason for separation from the last job on the wage level of new
employment using an establishment closure sample and layo® sample. We run following linear regression
formulations:
logWKis = Xis¯ + ¡ ¢DKH + !is + »Kis (3)
where the dependent variable logWKis is the log of weekly earnings for individual i at survey week s in
location K, X is a vector of observed individual characteristics (gender, age, education, square of years of
education, and marital status), the dummy variable DKH = 1 if individual i moves to location K due to
household related reasons, and otherwise if individual i moves to location K to actively seek employment.
!is is unobserved abilities for individual i, »Kis is unobserved ¯rm technology if individual i is employed in
this ¯rm. Finally, uKis is a mixed error component of !is and »
K
is .
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6.2 Results
The expected signs of the estimates on self-selection are as follows. First, the coe±cient ¡ of urban-rural
migrant is expected to be positive (i.e. job-seeking migrants receive lower rural premiums than migrants
based on household relations because of the negative self-selection on exit decisions from the urban labor
market).
H0 : ¡UR < 0
H1 : ¡UR > 0 (negative self-selection for job-seekers)
Secondly, the coe±cient ¡ of rural-urban migrant is expected to be negative (i.e. job-seeking migrants
receive higher urban premiums than migrants based on household relations because of the positive self-
selection on entry decisions into the urban labor market).
H0 : ¡RU ¸ 0
H1 : ¡RU < 0 (positive self-selection for job-seekers)
The estimates for the four subsamples urban (rural) migrants to urban (rural) areas in Table 5 provide
evidence that there are highly signi¯cant on self-selection e®ects of unobserved abilities: (1) there is positive
self-selection for new entries into both the urban and rural labor markets from rural areas; (2) there is
negative self-selection for new exits from the urban labor market and movers within urban areas. The
estimates show that the household related subgroup has approximately 4.8% lower wages than migrants in
the job related subgroup in the rural to rural subsample. Alternatively, the estimates show that job-seeking
migrants earn 4.8% higher wages than migrants in the household related subgroup. Job turnovers and
established residences in the rural area have positive self-selection e®ects. For the urban to rural subsample,
there is a negative and highly signi¯cant self-selection bias of unobserved abilities for job-seeking migrants,
who have 5.3% lower wages than movers with household head.
On average, job-seeking migrants in the urban-rural subsample have a 5.3% lower level of rural true
premium than migrants in the household related subgroup. In other words, if the job-seeking subgroup
sample had the same level of ability as the household related subgroup, the job search sample will have a
true rural premium. Therefore, the \low ability" of the job search sample reduces their own rural premium
from the true rural premium to a lower level. Nearly all urban to rural movers were former migrants to
urban areas from rural areas.
For the rural-urban and urban-urban subgroups, migrants for household related reasons have a true
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urban premium independent of self-selection e®ects with respect to location choice and ability based on
identi¯cation strategy in the previous section. The coe±cient of this dummy variable suggests that there is
a di®erential of unobserved ability from the urban premium. Estimates for the rural-urban subsample show
a positive and highly signi¯cant self-selection bias of unobserved abilities for job-seekers, who have 8.8%
higher wages than the household related control group. Estimates for the job-seeking migrants in the rural-
urban subsample show a positive self-selection e®ect of abilities. Estimates for the urban-urban subsample
also show negative and signi¯cant self-selection e®ects of unobserved ability for migrant job-seekers who
have 8.0% lower wages than those in the household related control group. Job turnovers and established
residence in the urban area do not seem to have positive self-selection e®ects.
We are now ready to say that there are positive and quite signi¯cant (1% level) self-selection e®ects of
unobserved abilities for migrants from rural areas for both the rural to rural and rural to urban subsamples.
But on average, there is a signi¯cant negative self-selection bias of unobserved abilities for migrants from
urban areas for both urban to rural and urban to urban subsamples.5 In summary, the high ability of
young migrants from rural areas is clearly re°ected in wages in rural and urban areas on average. Our
model predicts that a migrant with high ability can keep a job as long as he/she obtains a job requiring
skill/training/know-how early in the migration process.
Migrants who ¯nd jobs choose to stay. But migrants who cannot ¯nd jobs return to their place of origin
or move to another location to seek jobs. Both rural movers from urban areas and urban movers from urban
areas seem to have a bad match in urban area. However, the results using the urban to rural and urban to
urban subsamples (see Table 5) show that there are smaller learning e®ects in urban area for the job-seeking
subgroup than for the household related subgroup. If there are positive spillovers into the urban area, the
gaps between the two types of migrants mean that there is heterogeneity in learning through migrating
e®ects in urban areas.
7 Testing for Learning by Migrating
7.1 Speci¯cation and Estimation
We test our next hypothesis on learning through migrating e®ects to improve productivity after a young
worker moves to location K. Learning through migrating e®ects are mentioned by Glaeser and Mar¶e (2001)
5These results support the \lemon" e®ect for migrants from urban area. On the other hand, they also support the no lemon
e®ect for migrants from rural area.
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using panel regressions. It is a comprehensive work. However, there are shortcomings concerning the self-
selection bias on migration decision and destinations.
The outcome variable is also the wage level. We divide the explanatory variable DKH into the short
DKH (S) and long D
K
H (L) cohort. To test for learning through migrating e®ects, we compare the coe±cients
¡(S) and ¡(L) of the household related subgroup dummy variables. The coe±cient ¡(L) includes various
sources of improved productivity due to individual e®orts in location K (for example, formal training or
learning by doing), due to knowledge spillovers in location K, and due to reallocation e®ects by sorting and
two-sided learning between individuals and ¯rms. The occurrence of reallocation represents self-selection on
ability. Information on matching quality is accumulated by ¯rms and individuals after production.
If we assume that ability does not change over time, we can say that reallocation e®ects are self-selective
innate (or natural) ability. If we assume that individual ability changes over time through learning by
migrating e®ects, we can say that reallocation e®ects are self-selective in terms of acquired ability after
migration. If any doubt remains about identi¯cation between learning through migrating e®ects (i.e. indi-
vidual e®orts and spillovers) and reallocation e®ects, it is clear that average productivity can be higher for a
long cohort L than a short cohort S.6 To see these e®ects, we also specify and estimate cohort di®erentials
in estimates of reason di®erentials from the cross-section wage function by the following linear regressions.
logWKis = Xis¯ + ¡(S) ¢DKH (S) + ¡(L) ¢DKH (L) + !is + »Kis (4)
where logWKis is the log of weekly earnings for individual i in locationK, Xis a vector of observable individual
characteristics (gender, age, years of education, square of years of education, marital status), the dummy
variables DKH (S) and D
K
H (L) are equal to 1 if individual i moved with the household head to location K and
has short (long, respectively) experience in location K, and uKis is an error term of individual unobserved
abilities Ái and ¯rm's technology, »is.
7.2 Results
We also estimate the e®ects of dummy variables DKH (0), D
K
H (1), D
K
H (2), D
K
H (3), and D
K
H (4) in the four
migration °ow subsamples: (1 ) rural to rural; (2 ) urban to rural; (3 ) rural to urban; and (4 ) urban to
urban. The coe±cient of dummy variable ¡ signi¯es the di®erentials of the location speci¯c premium between
6The literature on TFP shows in detail that the higher level of productivity among long-lived ¯rms than short-lived ¯rms
can be explained by the exiting of non-productive ¯rms. This reallocation e®ect can also be drawn from the literature on the
export market and two-sided learning in the labor market. Our theoretical model also predicts natural selection or survival of
the ¯ttest through job mobility.
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the two migrant subgroups of job-seekers and household relations in each location K. The coe±cient ¡(0)
means the di®erence of the location premium for staying for the two migrant groups with less than 1 year
of duration. The same is true for the coe±cient ¡(1), ¡(2), ¡(3), and ¡(4) for long-staying workers in the
two groups for 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years of duration respectively.
The estimates for each sample in Table 6 and Table 7 show that there are smaller reallocation e®ects
in the urban labor market and there are no learning e®ects in urban areas for \new exits for job-seeking"
from urban areas: (1) the wage gap between job-seekers and household related migrants in the rural-rural
subsample increases due to the improvement of job-matching e®ects (or reallocation e®ects through self-
selection) for job-seeking migrants looking for jobs in rural area; (2) the wage gap between job seekers
and household related migrants in the urban-rural subsample due to learning through migrating e®ects for
household related migrants; (3) the wage gap between job seekers and household relations in the rural-
urban subsample increases due to the improvement job-matching e®ects (or reallocation e®ects through
self-selection) for migrants of looking for jobs in urban areas; (4) the wage gap between job-seekers and
household related migrants in the urban-urban subsample due to learning through migrating e®ects for
household related migrants.
It is worthwhile to mention the relationship between the short- and the long-duration migrants in each
migration stream. Table 2 presents some interesting facts regarding the similarity and di®erences between
the reasons for migration. Here, we look more carefully into our empirical results. The estimate for the
rural-to-rural subsample with short-staying (1 year and 2 years of duration) in rural areas shows that job-
seekers have 3.4% higher wages and 7.2% higher wages, respectively, than household related migrants. On
the other hand, for long-staying (3 years and 4 years of duration) migrants in rural areas after migration
from another rural area, job-seekers have 10.9% and 9.1% higher wages, respectively, than household related
migrants. There is a steep rise from short to long-experienced migrants between the two types of migrants.
It seems reasonable to suppose that there is learning through migrating e®ects in rural areas or reallocation
e®ects gained from the sorting process through job-matching. Increased average productivity of job-seekers
can be explained by the di®erences of the survival rate between the two types of migrants: job-seekers and
household relations migrants. Migrants who cannot ¯nd a good job match seem to change their location at
an early stage, before the second year. However, migrants who ¯nd a good match will stay in rural areas
and become a long-duration migrant. It is likely that an improvement in average productivity for a long
cohort of job-seekers can be explained by the survival of the ¯ttest in the rural to rural subsample.7
7A possible explanation is: if learning by migrating e®ects exist, then the wage gap between short and long durations can
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The estimate for the urban-to-rural subsample with the short-staying migrants in Table 6 shows that
migrants looking for jobs have 11.2% and 15.5% lower wages than migrants who move with the household
head when they reach 2 and 3 years of duration in rural areas. On the other hand, for migrants staying less
than 1 year and 1 year, there is no signi¯cant di®erence between job-seeking and household relation migrants.
We can construct two hypotheses: (1) self-selection based on abilities; (2) learning through migrating e®ects
in each location. The wage gap between the short and long cohort among the two types of migrants can be
explained by the di®erence of learning speeds in rural areas.8 From Table 2, we see that the exit patterns
of the two types of migrants are similar: job-searching versus moving with the household head. We may
say that the di®erence between exit patterns is not the main reason. The result for migrants with 4 years
of duration in rural area suggests that there is no signi¯cant di®erence between job-seeking and household
relation migrants. The household relations migrant who can ¯nd a good match stay in rural area and enter
long duration status, with 4 years of duration.
Let us, for the moment, examine urban migrants. The estimate for the rural to urban subsample with
short-experienced migrants in urban areas in Table 7 shows that job-seeking migrants with 1 and 2 years of
duration in urban areas experience 17% higher wages and 8.6% higher wages, respectively, than household
relation migrants. On the other hand, especially for long-staying migrants with 4 years of duration job-
seekers experience 20.6% higher wages than household relation migrants. The wage gap between the two
types of migrants decreases due to convergence of abilities between the two groups or due to their remaining
in urban job-seeking. Exit patterns are also quite similar for job-seekers versus household relation migrants,
as seen from Table 2. If a young migrant has a bad match in an urban area, then he/she will change
his/her location to look for another job match, the average productivity of migrants in urban area can be
improved over time. We observe that this reallocation e®ect is common for the two types of migrants. We
can present two explanations: ¯rst, a decline in the reallocation e®ects among job-seeking migrants is the
main explanation, it is likely that less able workers will remain in the urban area due to the thickness of
the market. This leads to our ¯nding of a declining gap between the two types of migrants. Secondly, if
learning by migrating e®ects is the main explanation, we may say that household relation migrants catch
be explained by the di®erence in learning speeds between the two types of migrants. Another explanation is: if reallocation
e®ects (through self-selection) are the main reason, then the wage gap between short and long durations can be explained by
the di®erence of exit speeds from the rural labor market between job-seekers and household relation migrants.
8In the previous section, we discussed the fact that there is negative self-selectivity in ability for urban to rural movers.
There are complementarities between ability and learning speed. We cannot identify whether ability is main explanation or not
here. Even if any complication remains about complementarities, it is clear that there is gap between the two types of migrants
from urban to rural areas.
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up with job-seeking migrants: there is an observed convergence among urban migrants.
Our results on urban migrants show that in the urban-to-urban subsample, short-staying job-seeking
migrants with less than 1 year of duration experience 5.1% higher wages than household relation migrants.
But this estimate is not signi¯cant. This result suggests there are no signi¯cant di®erences between the two
types of migrants among the new migrants from urban to urban areas. On the other hand, long-staying (3
years and 4 years of duration) job-seeking migrants experience 22% and 19.6% lower wages than household
relation migrants. We shall now look more carefully into the two explanations. First, there is a substantial
di®erence in the total number of movers between those looking for a job versus those moving with the head
of family. If reallocation e®ects are the main explanation of the wage gap, then we will see a decrease in this
gap: there are strong reallocation e®ects among migrants looking for jobs, and sorting e®ects force them to
improve their average productivity. But this hypothesis contradicts the gap of the two estimates. Average
productivity among migrants looking for jobs decreases. Secondly, we can refer to the possibility of learning
by migrating e®ects in the urban area. It seems reasonable that the di®erentials in ability or di®erentials
of learning speed for the two types of migrants are quite signi¯cant on average. The initial gap between
migrants looking for jobs and migrants moving with the household head seems to wide over time.
7.3 Robustness Check
In earlier parts of the paper, we discussed the di®erences in the learning by migrating e®ects due to various
reasons for the four migration streams. Next, we test for learning e®ects related to the length of stay of
migrants by the reason for migration. Two dummy variables are used to estimate the impacts of the length
of stay on productivity for two types of migrants: job-seekers and those based on household relations. For
job-seeking migrants (i.e. Z = 0), the dummy variable DKH is equal to 1 if individual i moved to location K.
To see the learning by migrating e®ects of the length of stay on productivity, we specify and estimate
reason di®erentials based on cohort di®erentials from the cross-section wage function. We run the following
regression equation for the reason of migration: job-seeking migrants (DKH = 0) and those moving with
household head (DKH = 1).
logWKis = Xis¯ + ¡S(1) ¢ d1 + ¡S(2) ¢ d2 + ¡S(3) ¢ d3 + ¡S(4) ¢ d4 + !is + »Kis (5)
where where logWKis is the log of weekly earnings for individual i in location K, Xis is a vector of observable
individual characteristics (gender, age, years of education, square of years of education, marital status),
coe±cient ¡S(1) captures the di®erence in productivity between movers who have a duration of less than
1 year and a duration of 1 year for the job-seeking migrants. On the other hand, coe±cienct ¡S(2) also
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captures the di®erence of productivity between movers who have a duration of less than 1 year and of 2
years among migrants based on household relations, and so on.
These coe±cients provide us with an empirical understanding of the impact of duration on abilities.
There is an \endogeneity problem?: each individual chooses the length of stay in location K after the
migration, and the pitfall is related to comparing two coe±cients due to sample truncation. However, we
can focus on the results of the share of long-experienced migrants for the two types of migrants because
Table 2 suggests same patterns of sample-attrition for job-seekers and people with household relations among
urban-rural migrants and among rural-urban migrants.
Empirical results are given in Table 8 for the rural labor market and Table 9 for the urban labor
market. There is sharp empirical observation of learning by migrating e®ects for job-seekers in rural areas:
we have several results to show that the coe±cient is positively signi¯cant at the 1% level. Job-seeking
migrants from rural to rural areas experienced a gradual wage increase between 2.3% (1 year of duration),
5.5% (2 years), 3.5% (3 years), and 8.3% (4 years), respectively. On the other hand, we have the following
observation regarding the learning by migrating e®ects for rural-rural migrants based on household relations:
the coe±cient is also positively signi¯cant at the 1% level. Household-related migrants from rural to rural
areas also experienced a slight wage increase of 4.2% (1 year of duration), 5.3% (2 years), 3.8% (3 years), and
4.3% (4 years) respectively. For the learning by migrating e®ects of urban-rural migrants based on household
relations, We also obtained signi¯cant coe±cients. In conclusion: (1) there is a steep wage increase for job-
seekers with long experienced (3 years of duration and more) in the rural labor market and (2) however,
there is sudden wage declining for migrants with short experience (1 year and 2 years of duration) based
on household relations in the rural labor market. The wage level for migrants with household relations is
higher when they newly enter a in rural area from an urban area. The main di®erence in the reason for
migration seems to be derived from the di®erence of search intensity in the early stages after migration.
The empirical results in Table 9 also suggest that the advantage of migrants with long experience exists.
\New entrants" into the urban labor market experience learning by migrating e®ects for job-seekers: the
coe±cients are positively signi¯cant at the 1% level. While \new entrants" into the urban labor market
experience learning by migrating e®ects for those with household relations: the coe±cients are negatively
signi¯cant at the 1% level. Job-seeking migrants from rural to rural areas experienced a gradual wage
increase of 6.8% (1 year of duration), 9.9% (2 years), 14.9% (3 years), and 22.4% (4 years), respectively.
Comparing the impacts of duration on wages between rural and urban areas for job-seeking migrants, there
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is an advantage of staying because of the thick market externalities in the urban area. Job-seeking migrants
within the urban labor market also bene¯t from search activities. On the other hand, migrants based on
household relations do not experience any bene¯t from staying in the urban labor market. There is no
advantage for household relation migrants to stay in the urban labor market: the coe±cient is negative
and signi¯cant. Job-seeking migrants from urban to urban areas experienced a gradual wage decrease of
-13.3% (3 years of duration) and -7.9% (4 years), respectively. Household related migrants from rural to
rural areas also experienced a slight wage decrease between -15.1% (1 year of duration) and -10.7% (3
years), respectively. We therefore conclude that both short (1 year and 2 years of duration) and long (3
years and 4 years of duration) experience job-seekers of rural origin with gains in the urban labor market.
These advantages of duration of stay come from search activities in the urban labor market (thick market
externalities).
8 Discussion and Conclusion
Some issues remain. The ¯rst is, the validity of our instrumental variable used in the reason for migration.
Recent works by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Angrist and Krueger (2001) argue for general shortcom-
ings of instrumental variables due to natural experiment. Our identi¯cation strategy depends on whether
moving with the household head to a new location is orthogonal to individual abilities: following the head
is exogenous. We have to consider that the location choice for migrants who move with the household head
seems to be independent of their characteristics. The choice of location seems to be exogenous for these
household relation migrants. But we can conjecture the existence of a co-location problem for husbands and
wives, following Costa and Kahn (2001). If there are non-random strategic complementarities to co-location
between wives and husbands, our identi¯cation strategy fails. It is an unsettled question. There is a room
for a further structural estimation of a model of collective behavior and household bargaining process in
migration decisions. Secondly, to study the self-selection e®ects on abilities and the learning through migrat-
ing, we used wage worker migrants. This leads to: sample selection bias. We have to examine transitions by
migrants to agricultural, self-employed, wage workers, and household workers such as housewives. Thirdly,
we do not control for the categories of occupation, industry, and ¯rm size. Self-selection e®ects on abilities
and learning by migrating e®ects can be quite di®erent for these categories.
In this paper we developed a simple framework for identifying the learning by migrating e®ects and
self-selection e®ects on abilities with an instrumental variable. This is the ¯rst attempt to identify learning
by migrating e®ects from self-selection e®ects using an exogenous source of variation, i.e., the reason for
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migration. This paper is useful for understanding the role of the urban labor market: natural selection or
the location of learning. Our empirical results for self-selection on migrating are summarized below: (1)
there is a signi¯cant positive self-selection based on abilities for rural-urban job-seekers; and (2) there is a
signi¯cant negative self-selection based on abilities for urban-rural job-seekers signi¯cantly. Evidence of a
positive selection for \new entrants" to urban areas from rural areas also supports ¯ndings of Borjas et al.
(1992). However, evidence of negative self-selection for \new exits" to the rural area from urban area does
not support for ¯ndings of Glaeser and Mar¶e (2001) using PSID and NLSY. The main di®erence between
the empirical results of Glaeser and Mar¶e (2001) and our results using the Thailand and Greater Bangkok
dataset is attributed to the number, size, and matching externalities in cities.
In short, these rigorous inferences suggest the existence of the survival of the ¯ttest in the urban labor
market. Highly able job-seekers tend to move to the urban labor market from rural areas, while less skilled
job-seekers tend to exit from the urban labor market to the rural labor market. The origin of migrants from
the urban labor market to rural areas can be rural areas. These migrants (i.e. returnees) moved from the
rural to the urban labor market and then back to the rural area because of bad job-matching experiences in
the urban labor market. Our empirical results for learning by migrating e®ects are summarized below: (1)
natural selection or survival of the ¯ttest plays a signi¯cant role in the urban labor market; and (2) there
are learning e®ects (through job-matching) for job-seeking migrants after migrating to urban areas. This
e®ect is larger in urban than in rural areas.
It seems reasonable to state that better job-matching can be found by rural-urban migrants based on
household relations after learning where better job opportunities are located in the thick market. It is due
to the di®erence in the necessity of getting a job between job-seekers and household relation migrants.
Household relation migrants have more search or waiting premiums than impatient job-seekers. The results
for both rural-urban migrants can apply to those results for both urban-rural migrants and urban-urban
migrants but not for rural-rural migrants. These results lead to the conclusion that there is a search option
in the thick market.
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Table 1: Position of Urbanization Patterns for Thailand in the World
Rank Country Primacy Country Megalopolis Country Urbanization
1 Thailand 24.994 Angola 0.857 UAE 0.997
2 Angola 15.520 Azerbaijan 0.846 South Korea 0.736
3 Chile 14.847 Ireland 0.841 Dominican 0.727
4 Peru 10.332 Paraguay 0.832 Lebanon 0.722
5 Lebanon 9.847 Sierra Leone 0.828 Japan 0.696
6 Sierra Leone 9.221 Lebanon 0.814 USA 0.689
7 Madagascar 9.078 Kyrgyzstan 0.785 Australia 0.659
8 Argentina 8.787 Tajikistan 0.7712 Venezuela 0.644
9 Hungary 8.707 Thailand 0.7706 Mexico 0.633
10 Mali 8.542 El Salvador 0.750 Chile 0.623
91 Ecuador 1.307 Venezuela 0.203 India 0.159
92 South Africa 1.282 South Africa 0.197 Mali 0.154
93 USA 1.267 Poland 0.173 Thailand 0.150
94 Vietnam 1.236 Germany 0.167 Tajikistan 0.147
95 China 1.194 Netherlands 0.159 Kenya 0.141
96 Cameroon 1.157 Ukraine 0.138 Madagascar 0.131
97 Australia 1.150 Russia 0.135 Sri Lanka 0.092
98 UAE 1.103 India 0.113 Niger 0.091
99 Syria 1.059 USA 0.085 Ethiopia 0.062
100 Netherlands 1.035 China 0.047 Nepal 0.056
Notes: Primacy means the level of urban primacy: ratio of urban population residing in the largest city, to the second largest
city. The urban primacy of Thailand (about 25) is the highest in the world. Megalopolitan population means the ratio of the
Greater Bangkok Area to total urban population in Thailand. Almost 77% of urban residents are concentrated in Bangkok.
These two indices show an agglomeration of economic activity in Bangkok and also show that there is only one megalopolis in
Thailand. Finally, Urbanization means the ratio of the number of urban residents to whole domestic population. Only 15% of
the whole population is located in urban areas (i.e. almost 85% of the population is located in rural areas.).
Source: Author's calculation from United Nations World Urban Prospects 2000.
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Table 2: Sample Size by Reason, Migration Streams, and Duration
Subsample Less than 1 year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years Total
Rural-to-rural 11,530 9,377 8,141 6,412 4,061 39,521
Job-seeking 9,495 7,364 6,028 4,527 2,822 30,236
Household relations 2,035 2,013 2,113 1,885 1,239 9,285
Urban-to-rural 2,451 1,588 1,275 854 533 6,701
Job-seeking 2,094 1,339 1,056 711 435 5,635
Household relations 357 249 219 143 98 1,066
Rural-to-urban 1,185 1,318 1,282 1,113 696 5,594
Job-seeking 1,083 1,200 1,170 1,032 625 5,110
Household relations 102 118 112 81 71 484
Urban-to-urban 473 405 383 305 147 1,713
Job-seeking 248 218 216 147 57 886
Household relations 225 187 167 158 90 827
Notes: The ¯rst column shows migration streams and the reason for migration by migration stream. Each column shows years
of stay from time of migration until the survey week. We exclude students, self-employed, housewives, and farmers in the
analysis. We focus on migrant wages worker only. We also drop the sample of Education/Training, Medical treatment, and
Other reasons. We classify migrants related to job search, job transfer, and back to former place of residence into \Job-seeking"
migrants.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996.
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Table 3: Log of Weekly Wages for New Entrants into the Rural Labor Market by Duration
Subsample Mean S.D Obs.
Rural-to-rural migrants 6.807 .660 39521
Less than 1 year 6.656 .668 11530
1 year 6.796 .657 9377
2 years 6.870 .634 8141
3 years 6.915 .641 6412
4 years 6.959 .647 4061
Urban-to-rural migrants 6.859 .694 6701
Less than 1 year 6.705 .670 2451
1 year 6.853 .690 1588
2 years 6.944 .672 1275
3 years 7.025 .674 854
4 years 7.114 .729 533
Notes: All new entrants into rural labor market are classi¯ed by reason for migration, migration streams, and years of stay. All
new entrants is restricted to wage workers aged 40 or below.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996.
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Table 4: Log of Weekly Wages for New Entrants into the Urban Labor Market by Duration
Subsample Mean S.D Obs.
Rural-to-urban migrants 6.771 .474 5594
Less than 1 year 6.652 .460 1185
1 year 6.740 .466 1318
2 years 6.777 .443 1282
3 years 6.840 .490 1113
4 years 6.909 .490 696
Urban-to-urban migrants 7.075 .507 1713
Less than 1 year 6.963 .480 473
1 year 7.070 .496 405
2 years 7.093 .516 383
3 years 7.142 .494 305
4 years 7.266 .548 147
Notes: All new entrants into the urban labor market are classi¯ed by reason for migration, migration stream, and duration of
stay. All new entrants are restricted to wage workers aged 40 or below.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996.
30
Table 5: Job-Seeking Migrants from Rural to Urban Had Higher Wage Level while Job-Seeking
Migrants from Urban to Rural Experienced Lower Wage Level
Subsample ¡ Adjusted R2 Obs.
Rural-to-rural ¡:048¤¤¤ .428 39521
(.005)
Urban-to-rural :053¤¤¤ .342 6701
(.018)
Rural-to-urban ¡:088¤¤¤ .329 5594
(.022)
Urban-to-urban :080¤¤¤ .474 1713
(.020)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The household related subgroup dummy variable equals 1 if
individual i moves to location K for household related reasons, and otherwise if individual i moves to location K to actively
seek employment. The explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, square of years of education, marital status,
and a household related subgroup dummy. All individual explanatory variables are highly signi¯cant at the 1% level. This table
focuses on each coe±cient of the exogenous variable on the migration decision: household related subgroup dummy. Numbers
in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996.
¤¤¤ signi¯cant at the 1 % level.
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Table 6: Household Related Subgroup Dummies in Wage Equations of Each Duration in the
Rural
Subsample ¡0 ¡1 ¡2 ¡3 ¡4
Rural-to-rural :013 ¡:034¤¤¤ ¡:072¤¤¤ ¡:109¤¤¤ ¡:091¤¤¤
(.011) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.016)
Adjusted R2 .359 .429 .455 .482 .438
Obs. 11530 9377 8141 6412 4061
Urban-to-rural :004 :037 :112¤¤¤ :155¤¤¤ :050
(.032) (.038) (.035) (.052) (.055)
Adjusted R2 .230 .340 .406 .437 .516
Obs. 2451 1588 1275 854 533
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, square
of years of education, marital status, and a household relation migrants dummy. All individual explanatory variables are highly
signi¯cant at the 1% level. This table also focuses on each coe±cient of the exogenous variable on the migration decision:
household relations migrants dummy. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996.
¤¤¤ signi¯cant at the 1% level.
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Table 7: Household Related Subgroup Dummies in Wage Equations of Each Duration in the
Urban
Subsample ¡0 ¡1 ¡2 ¡3 ¡4
Rural-to-urban :069 ¡:170¤¤¤ ¡:086¤¤ ¡:003 ¡:206¤¤¤
(.048) (.047) (.044) (.063) (.049)
Adjusted R2 .356 .363 .349 .275 .292
Obs. 1185 1318 1282 1113 696
Urban-to-urban ¡:051 :115¤¤¤ :036 :220¤¤¤ :196¤¤¤
(.040) (.040) (.049) (.041) (.076)
Adjusted R2 .418 .585 .427 .556 .421
Obs. 473 405 383 305 147
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education,
square of years of education, marital status, and a household relations migrants dummy. All individual explanatory variables
are highly signi¯cant at the 1% level. This table also focuses on each coe±cient of the exogenous variable on the migration
decision: household relations migrants dummy. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996.
¤¤¤ signi¯cant at the 1% level.
¤¤ signi¯cant at the 5% level.
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Table 8: Each Duration Dummy in Wage Equations by Reason for Migration in the Rural
Subsample 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years Adjusted R2 Obs.
Rural-to-rural
Job-seeking :023¤¤¤ :055¤¤¤ :035¤¤¤ :083¤¤¤ .464 30236
(.007) (.008) (.008) (.010)
Household relations :042¤¤¤ :053¤¤¤ :038¤¤¤ :043¤¤¤ .338 9285
(.015) (.015) (.015) (.017)
Urban-to-rural
Job-seeking ¡:010 :050¤¤¤ :069¤¤¤ :102¤¤¤ .347 5635
(.018) (.020) (.025) (.032)
Household relations ¡:188¤¤¤ ¡:168¤¤¤ ¡:064¤¤¤ ¡:049¤¤¤ .338 1066
(.054) (.058) (.058) (.071)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, square
of years of education, marital status, and durations of experience in rural area dummies. The benchmark duration is less than
1 year. All individual explanatory variables are highly signi¯cant at the 1% level. This table also focuses on each coe±cient of
Short experience dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
¤¤¤ signi¯cant at the 1% level.
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Table 9: Each Duration Dummy in Wage Equations by Reason for Migration in the Urban
Subsample 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years Adjusted R2 Obs.
Rural-to-urban
Job-seeking :068¤¤¤ :099¤¤¤ :149¤¤¤ :224¤¤¤ .357 5110
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.018)
Household relations ¡:087¤¤¤ ¡:190¤¤¤ ¡:155¤¤ ¡:173¤¤¤ .277 484
(.071) (.073) (.073) (.070)
Urban-to-urban
Job-seeking ¡:039 ¡:044 ¡:133¤¤¤ ¡:079¤¤¤ .434 886
(.035) (.032) (.037) (.052)
Household relations ¡:151¤¤¤ :003 ¡:107¤¤¤ ¡:058 .520 827
(.042) (.040) (.041) (.054)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, square
of years of education, marital status, and durations of experience in rural area dummies. The benchmark duration is less than
1 year. All individual explanatory variables are highly signi¯cant at the 1% level. This table also focuses on each coe±cient of
Short experience dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
¤¤¤ signi¯cant at the 1% level.
¤¤ signi¯cant at the 5% level.
35
